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AVIATION LAW "INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION" UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION - NINTH
CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT A TRAVELER'S INDEPENDENTLY
PURCHASED DOMESTIC FLIGHT IN A FOREIGN NATION
WAS NOT A "SINGLE OPERATION" OF INTERNATIONAL
TRAVEL UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION: COYLE V.
P. T. GARUDA INDONESIA
SPENCER H. BROMBERG

The Warsaw Convention ("Convention") governs "all international transportation of persons."1 Transportation is international when a passenger travels between two nations that are
High Contracting Parties to the Convention. Multiple stops on
multiple carriers constitute international travel if the segments
are regarded by the contracting parties as a "single operation" of
"undivided transportation."' In Coyle v. P.T. Garuda Indonesia,
the Ninth Circuit narrowly applied the definition of "international transportation," holding that two sets of tickets on the
same airline, one set international and the other set domestic,
purchased at different times and places, do not constitute a "single operation."4 The narrow holding in Coyle disregards the explicit text of the Convention and ignores the objective evidence
presented by the tickets.5 Moreover, the holding ignores modern trends in travel planning, creating a loophole for airlines to
selectively apply the Convention for separately purchased tickets
that would otherwise be considered a "single operation," while
undermining the primary goal of the Convention-to harmonize and unify international aviation law.

I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2001) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
2 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2).
" Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(3).
4 Coyle, 363 F.3d 979, 986-93 (9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter "Coyle IT].
5 Id. at 989-91.
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On September 6, 1997, Fritz G. and Djoeminah Baden
("Badens") departed for Jakarta, Indonesia using tickets purchased through Astra World Express, Inc. ("Astra"), a Portland,
Oregon travel agency.6 The tickets included multiple stops and
passage on multiple airlines, traveling to and returning from
Jakarta.7 While there was a dispute as to whether the Badens
arrived in Jakarta on Garuda Indonesia Airlines ("Garuda"), it
was undisputed that their flight leaving Jakarta was on Garuda.8
After arriving in Indonesia, the Badens contacted Garuda to
purchase two additional round-trip tickets to extend their travels
to Medan, Indonesia.9 The additional "Domestik" stop was
scheduled to departJakarta on Garuda at 11:30 a.m. on September 26th.1 ° While the domestic return flight from Medan to
Jakarta was left open, the subsequent international flight on
Garuda was scheduled to departJakarta at 8:00 a.m. on September 30th, ultimately destined for Portland." The Badens failed
to make any of the return flights from Medan to Portland because, on approach to Medan, Garuda Flight 152 flew into
the
2
side of a mountain killing all 232 passengers on board.'
Joyce Coyle filed a claim against Garuda for the wrongful
death of her parents under Article 17 of the Convention on September 22, 1999 in Oregon.1 3 Garuda moved to dismiss the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that the domestic leg was not part of a greater international itinerary covered
by the Convention.' 4 On April 30, 2001, the magistrate judge
issued his "Findings and Recommendation," concluding that
the domestic flight was "one leg of an international journey,"
which, under Article 28 of the Convention, granted the federal
district court in Oregon subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim.1 5 The district court reviewed the rulings.1 6 After review,
6 Id.

at 982.

7 Id.
8 Id.; Coylev. P.T. Garudalndon.180 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1163 & n.2 (D. Or. 2001)
[hereinafter "Coyle/ T].
9 Coyle IIH, 363 F.3d at 982.
10 Id. The method of payment does not affect the "single operation" determination. Id. at 991; See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1. Moreover, credit cards
often complicate the purchase process in the cash driven societies of Southeast
Asia.
11 Coyle, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 1163.
12 Coyle, 363 F.3d at 982.
13 Id. at 983 & n.4.
14 Id. at 983-84.
15 Id. at 984.
16 Id. n.7.
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on June 28, 2001, the district court adopted the magistrate's report and scheduled the case for trial. 17 Prior to oral argument,
the Ninth Circuit granted Garuda's interlocutory appeal regarding federal subject matter jurisdiction.'"
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to
dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 9 The
court held that the district court erred in finding a "single operation.

'2 '

To reach its holding, the court reasoned that 1) only

the single contract domestic tickets purchased in Jakarta would
be used to determine the parties' intent, and 2) the objective
intent evidenced by the domestic ticket was that of a separate
and independent side-trip with the final destination of Jakarta,
not Portland.2 '
The first issue the court addressed was whether two independently purchased tickets could be used to determine the objective intent of the parties. The court acknowledged that "to a
limited degree, certain objective evidence may connect flights together," but the tickets would need to be purchased at the same
time and place for such a connection. 22 To support this conclusion, the court referred to the Second Circuit's holding in Petrire
v. Spantax, S.A., where two sets of tickets, which were "issued
sequentially at the same time and at the same place for roundtrip travel," constituted a single contract for undivided transportation. 23 The court contrasted Petrirewith In re Air Crash Disaster
at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, where the court held that

the extrinsic evidence provided by separately purchased domestic and international flights failed to show a "single operation. 24
In In re Air Crash Disasterat Warsaw, members of a group were to

meet in New York from various domestic locations to embark on
an international journey.29 The domestic tickets were arranged
and paid for by each individual, while the subsequent international tickets were arranged and paid for by the group leader.26
The In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw court evaluated all tickets,
17

Id.

1s

Id.

19

1I. at 979, 994.

20

Id. at 986-89.

21

Id.

Id. at 989 (citing Petrire v. Spantax, S.A., 756 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1985)).
Id. (citing Petrire, 756 F.2d at 265).
24 Id. (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Pol., Mar. 14, 1980, 748 F.2d
94, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1984)).
25 Id. at 95.
22

23

26

Id.
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concluding that "not only would the passengers not be likely to
have considered the flights as a single operation, ...

but the

carriers could not have considered that they were successive. '"27
Thus, the Ninth Circuit reasoned the parties' intent from the
single contract domestic tickets.
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly concluded that only the single
contract domestic flight should be used to show a "single operation." The Convention's explicit text states that a "single operation" may consist of a "contract or a series of contracts.'28 Contrary
to the Convention's wording, the Petrireanalysis requires a single
"time and place of issuance" to constitute a "single operation. '"29
Independently purchased tickets, which constitute a series of
contracts, are excluded from the objective intent determination.
The D.C. Circuit Court in Haldimann v. Delta Airlines, Inc. recog-

nized the narrow interpretation of the Petrire analysis, noting
that, "curiously, [the Second Circuit] appeared to assume that a
single operation required that there be only one contract."'
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit fails to distinguish In re Air Crash
Disasterat Warsaw from the present case, where the court looked
at both sets of tickets and determined that the evidence did not
show that the domestic and international flights were regarded
as a "single operation. 3 1 Unlike the passengers in In re Air Crash
Disasterat Warsaw, the Badens were not part of a scattered group
meeting in a domestic location, arriving on different airlines,
before embarking on a greater international journey.3 2 The tickets were handled, paid for, and issued on an individual basis; the
domestic leg occurred after the international journey commenced; and the return flights on the same airline, ultimately
destined for Portland, were successive. 3 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
should have relied on both tickets, sufficiently linked by extrinsic evidence, rather than narrowly relying on the single contract
domestic ticket.
The Ninth Circuit's second issue was to determine the objective intent of the parties from the relevant domestic tickets. The
court reasoned that the unambiguous evidence failed to show a
"single operation" because the domestic ticket had an open re27
28
29

30
31

32

33

Id. at 97.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(3) (emphasis added).
Coyle, 363 F.3d at 989 (citing Petrire, 756 F.2d at 265).
Haldimann v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 168 F.3d 1324, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, 748 F.2d at 95-97.
Id. at 95.
Coyle, 363 F.3d at 982; cf In re Air Crash Disasterat Warsaw, 748 F.2d at 94-97.
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turn date, had no reference number or symbol to connect it to
the return flights to Portland, and had been labeled "Domestik." 14 The court also concluded that the intended final destination of Portland was not dispositive of a "single operation,"
holding that there could be multiple
final destinations on one
3' 5
"larger international journey. 1
The primary issue regarding the parties' intent was the lack of
a connection to the greater international itinerary located on
the domestic ticket. The court rejected the argument that domestic and international flights could be part of a single international itinerary without identifying information on the domestic
ticket.3 6 The Haldimann court noted that a record locator on
each ticket was sufficient to connect two flights on different airlines. 7 Similarly, in Vergara, ticket booklets for flights on different airlines were sufficiently connected when, among other
ordinary particulars, the tickets included a credit card number,
an itinerary, and a place of origin and destination.3" Additionally, the court found that a passport presented at ticketing did
not give Garuda notice of the greater international itinerary.3 "
The ticket labeled "Domestik," absent a connection to the international flight, was dispositive that the parties intended the
flight as a domestic side-trip. The court rejected the district
court's analysis that the label "Domestik" was of little relevance
in determining intent." The court concluded that, if the passengers could translate the term, they would be precluded from
claiming that the trip was part of a greater international itinerary.4 ' To support this conclusion, the court distinguished In re
Air Crash Disaster of Aviateca Flight 901, a case where the court
discounted the importance of certain notations when "there is
no reason to believe that the passengers had any idea what the
significance of the ... designations [were] or whether those designations conflicted with or were representative of their intentions when their tickets were issued."4 2 Unlike the arcane
Coyle, 363 F.3d at 989-90.
Id. at 991.
Id. at 989-90.
Id. (citing Haldimann, 168 F.3d at 1325).
38 Id. (citing Vergara v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines", 390 F. Supp. 1266, 1267-68
(D. Neb. 1975)).
39 Id. at 993.
40 Id. at 990.
41 Id.
42 Id. (citing In re Air Crash Disaster of Aviateca Flight 901 Near San Salvador,
El Sal. On Aug. 9, 1995, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342-43 (S.D. Fla. 1997)).
34
35
36
37
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industry codes of "SITI" and "SOTO" on the tickets in In re Air
Crash Disaster of Aviateca 901, the court reasoned that the label
"Domestik" was not misleading, and must have been understood
3
by the passengers.1
Finally, the court found that the objective intent expressed by
the tickets showed the final destination as Jakarta, not Portland.
The courtjoined the Second and Fifth Circuits, holding that the
parties' intent, expressed by the commercial tickets, "determine[s] both a traveler's destination and whether ...transpor44
tation constituted a single operation of international travel."
Since the domestic tickets determined intent, the court rejected
the facial inference that Portland, rather than Jakarta, was the
final destination listed in the contract.4 5 The court distinguished
its earlier ruling in Sopcak, which allowed the use of "tickets and
other instruments" to evidence a final destination. 46 The court
noted that "other instruments" could be used in the absence of
tickets, as occurs with chartered flights, but rejected the notion
that both a ticket and an overall itinerary could be used together
to contradict a final destination listed on the ticket.4 7 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the passengers intended to engage
in a domestic side-trip, not part of the international itinerary. 48
The court erred in determining the parties' intent from the
tickets. The objective evidence presented by the domestic ticket
was sufficient to connect the flight with an international segment destined for Portland. Despite the court's reference to the
open ticket, all cases cited by the court stated that an open ticket
constitutes a contract for return carriage and objectively shows
intent to return. 49 Additionally, the domestic flights were connected to the greater international itinerary. The court's principle argument is that the Badens tickets lacked an identifier
43 Id.
44 Id. at

987.
45 Id. at 991.
46 Id. at 991-92.
47
48

Id.
Id.

49 Id. at 987-93; see Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1997); Petrire,
756 F.2d at 265-66; Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Trans. Co., 962 F.2d 387, 389 (5th
Cir. 1992); Lee v. China Airlines, Ltd., 669 F. Supp. 979, 981 (D.D. Cali. 1987);
Stanford v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 648 F. Supp. 657, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Vergara,
390 F. Supp. at 1266; In re Alleged Food Poisoning Incident, March 1984, 770
F.2d 3, 6-7 (2d Cir. 1985); Gayda v. LOT Polish Airlines, 702 F.2d 424, 425 (2d
Cir. 1983).
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present in both Haldimann and Vergara.5' The court failed, however, to note that each case involved tickets on multiple air carriers. The additional identifiers required to link flights on
different carriers acknowledged that each carrier had a unique
infrastructure, ticketing policies and internal systems. In the
present case, the domestic tickets and the subsequent international return flight destined for Portland were on Garuda. Moreover, two pieces of information connected the flights, the name
on the ticket and the passport number. Unlike with different
airlines, it is reasonable to assume that the computer system,
with name and passport number, would highlight the return international flights on Garuda scheduled to depart four days
later. Thus, Garuda scheduled the Badens domestic leg with
knowledge it was connected to a greater international itinerary
destined for Portland, Oregon.
The court incorrectly concluded that the term "Domestik" was
understood by the Badens. The court's comparison of "SITI/
SOTO" and "Domestik" is misleading. Had the tickets not used
"SITI/SOTO" and instead used "sale and issuance of the ticket
occurred inside [/outside] the country of commencement," passengers would have been able to read but not understand the
implications under the Convention. Similarly, one can infer that
"Domestik" means domestic without grasping Convention implications. The district court provided alternative interpretations,
the most important being that domestic legs of international
journeys are often labeled domestic, even though they constitute a "single operation" of undivided international
transportation.'
Finally, the court incorrectly determined that the Badens' final destination was Jakarta, not Portland. Ordinarily, courts
have held that for the purposes of the Convention, a journey
can have only one destination.5 2 The goal is to grant a passenger
jurisdiction in the place of "principal and permanent residence. '' 5' The Badens purchased the international tickets before
they purchased the additional domestic tickets, evidencing Portland as their final destination. To conclude that the Badens intended any place but Portland as a final destination is wholly
50 Coyle, 363 F.3d at 990.
51 Coyle, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 1166-67.
52 Id. at 1164.
53 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, opened for signature May 28, 1999, art. 33(2) ICAO Doc. 9740 [hereinafter
Montreal Convention].
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unreasonable. Moreover, Garuda knew or should have known
the destination because they provided two sequential legs of the
international journey home. Thus, the objective intent expressed by the tickets shows that the parties regarded the flights
as a "single operation" with the final destination of Portland,
Oregon.
The court's holding ignores modern trends in travel planning
and subverts the goal to unify and harmonize international aviation law. The modern phenomena of "ticketless" travel and electronic ticketing may not provide passengers with the evidence
necessary to show the parties' intent at the time of contract.
Also, travelers increasingly purchase and modify tickets through
online websites, acting as their own agent. If a passenger intended a single operation in one of these situations, he would
be unable to avail themselves of Convention protection or
would be unable to provide objective evidence in the event of an
accident. At a minimum, the court's narrow interpretation
would require educating the public on the need to link independently purchased tickets and require acknowledgement of
the greater international itinerary. Otherwise, the increase in
separately purchased tickets and "ticketless" travel would encourage "artful pleading" by the airlines "seeking to opt out of
the Convention's liability scheme when local law promised recovery" less than that prescribed by the treaty, and may deny
potential plaintiffs a suitable jurisdiction. 54 Lastly, the court's
narrow interpretation thwarts the primary goal of the Convention to "achieve uniformity of rules governing claims arising
from international air transportation.
A broad interpretation of the term "international transportation" protects passengers using modern ticketing methods and
"enables international travelers to secure the benefits of the
treaty regime even for segments of international transportation
that are wholly within the territory of a signatory with a tort system far narrower than that of the treaty. '56 Moreover, a broad
interpretation comports with the modern understanding of the
Convention that with "the increasing strength of the airline industry, the balance has properly shifted away from protecting

54 El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 171 (1999).
55 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 169 (citing E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 532

(1991)).
56 Haldimann, 168 F.3d at 1326.
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the carrier and toward protecting the passenger. ' 57 Finally, a
broad interpretation further standardizes international aviation
law. When the airlines have constructive notice of the greater
international itinerary, separately purchased tickets for an international journey should constitute a "single operation."
57 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 171 n.12 (citing Tseng v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d
99, 107 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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